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No duty of governments is niore universally conceded "
than that of ready and complete fulfillment of their obliptions. But the doctrine of the exemption of the sovereig ,.
from suit, based upon the jtory that the government is,
always ready-and willing to pay its debts without suit,/.
practically makes the government the- judge in its own
cause, in violation alike of natural justice and of the rule qf law existing in every other department of jurisprudence.
In every other legal relation than that of the citizen claiming the fulfillment of an obligation on the part of the gov-.
ernment it is a recognized principle that '"where there is a
right there is a remedy." But where the government is
concerned the right of suit is of so recent origin, and is
still so- hampered with restrictions and limitations that

I A paper read

before the World's Congress on Jurisprudence and

Law Reform, at Chicago, August 9, 1893.
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there are still many classes of just legal obligations of the
government for the enforcement of which the only remedy
lies in the uncertain chances of petition to Congress.' Fortunately, however, the time-honored maxim that "The
king can do no wrong" has been declared by our highest
judicial tribunal to have. no existence in this country either
I"in reference to the government of the United States, or
6f the several St.tes, or of any of their officers." 2 And
referring to the doctrine of the exemption of the sovereign
from suit it has again been said by the same high court
that " It is difficult to see on what solid foundation of principle the exemption from liability to suit rests."'
.
And in a still earlier case the idea that the right to
sue the government is a matter of favor was repudiated,
and the suability of the government placed upon the just
and solid ground that "It is as much the duty of the government as of individuals to fulfill its obligations."'
The framers. of the Constitution were not unmindful
of the necessity for providing means for adjudicating the
rights of citizens against the government, and placed in
that instrument among the subjects enumerated for the
exercise of judicial power, "controversies to which the
United States shall be a party."' Although it was never
doubted that this embraced cases in which the United
States were defendant as well as plaintiff, it was more
than half a century before any steps were taken to make
the constitutional grant of power effective by legislation
providing for suits against the government.
Judge STORY, writing in 1833, says: "It has sometimes been thought that this is a serious defect in the organization of the judicial department of the national gbvernmenj. It is not, however, an objection to the Constitution
itself, but it lies, if at all, against Congress for not having
ISilliman v. United States, ioi U. S. 465, 471; United States v.
McDougall's Admr., 121 U. S., 89, 98.
Langford v. United States, 1oi U. S., 341.
'United States v. Lee, io6 U. S., 196, 206.
4 United States v. Klein, 13 Wall., 128, 144.
5 Art. 3, 2.
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provided, as it is clearly within their constitutional authority to do, an adequate remedy for all private grievances of
this sort in the Courts of the United States. '
It was not,, however, till 1855 that a court was created
"for the investigation of claims against the United States. "'
At first the "Court of Claims" was a court only in name.
Its functions were confined to reporting in each case a
special bill- embodying its conclusions for the action of
Congress. In 1863, however, it received authority to rehder final judgments for or against the United States,' and
in 1866 such judgments were freed from a power of revision, with which the Secretary of the Treasury had at first
been invested over them, and were made absolute adjudica- tions of the liability of the government.4 It has ever since .
taken rank with those "tribunals inferior to the Supreme
Court," which Congress is empowered by the Constitution
to "Irdain and establish."
In 1887 concurrent jurisdiction of suits against- the'
United States was vested in the District and Circuit Courts of the United States in a -limited class of cases.5 Little
practical result, however, has followed from this last grant
of jurisdiction, as comparatively few such suits are instituted ,'
in these courts, and the Court of Claims remains the favorit&
tribunal for suitors against the government.
In all this legislation the jurisdiction has been carefully limited to claims arising ex contractu. Claims arising
from torts are by the earlier legislation impliedly, and 'by
the later expressly,7 excluded from judicial determination.
Special acts are, however, sometimes passed referring such
cases to the courts in particular instances, being generally
1 Commentaries on the Constitution,
2

By act of 1855, February 24, ch.

Rev. Stats., 1o49.
3 By act of 1863, March 3, ch.

92, 12

4 By act of x866, March I7, Ch. 19,

5 By act of i887, March 3, ch. 359,
559-

1678.

122, 10

U. S. Stat. at Large, 612;

U. S. Stat. at Large, 765.
11, 14 U. S. Stat. at Large, 9.
2, I Supp. to Rev. Stat. U. S.,

6 Gibbons v. United States, 8 Wall., 269.
7 By i of the act of 1887, situra.
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those of collision resulting from alleged negligence in the

navigation of public vessels.'
The jurisdiction again is limited to demands for money
damages, and does not embrace suits for specific performance,
or for the restitution of property, real or personal.' These
again are sometimes made the subject of special reference in
particular cases,3 though as to land in the possession of the
government claimed by a private individual an action of
ejectment against the officer in possession is often an
available remedy.'
Interest, too, is not allowed up to the time of the rendition of judgment unless the contract expressly stipulates
for it. 5

:

*

No complaint can be made that this legislation is not
, sufficiently guarded in its protection of the interests of the
government.
If we turn our attention from claims against the Federal government, to those against the several States, we
shall find a much less liberal allowance of the right of suit.
The greatest diversity -prevails among the constitutions and
statutes of different States., The whole subject is within
the control of each State, for the sovereign prerogative of
exemption from suit belongs to each State as fully as it
does to the United States. True by the orilginal Constitution of the United States, a State might be sued by
original process in the Supreme Cburt of the United States
by a citizen of any other State, or of *aforeign nation.
But this liability to suit was taken away by the Eleventh
Amendment, and the Supreme Court of the United States
1 Case of schooner "Ada A. Andrews," 18 Stat. L., 2O1; Sampson
v. United States, 12 C. CIs., 480; Case of the schooner "Flight," i 9 Stat.
L., 5o3; Thrush v. United States, 14 C. CIs., 435; Case of the schooner
'"Dom Pedro," 20 Stat L., 483; Prescott v. United States, i9 C. CIs., 684;
Case of the steamer "I. N. Bunton," 25 Stat. L., 1334; Walton v. United
States, 24 C. CIs., 372.
2 United States v. Jones, 131 U. S., i.
I Hot Springs Cases, 92 U. S., 698; Myers v. United States, 24 C.
CIs., 448.
4 United States v. Lee, io6 U. S., 196.
5 Rev. Stat. U. S., ? lO91.
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has recently expressed serious doubts whether the States
were ever, by a correct construction, even of the original
constitution, thus subject to suit.' However this may be,
there is no question that no State can now be sued in any2
court without its own consent, except by the United States,
by a sister State,3 or by a foreign government.
While some of the State constitutions expressly provide for the bringing of suits against the State,4 others
expressly forbid that the State shall ever be made a defendant in any suit at law or in equity.5 In a majority the
old rule prevails, that no suit can be brought against the
sovereign.

6

Virginia claims the rank of the pioneer State in the
abrogation of this antiquated injustice. "It has ever been
the cherished policy of Virginia to allow to her citizens and
others the largest liberty of suit against herself, and ihere
has never been a moment since October, 1778, but two
years and three months after she became an independent
State, that all persons have not enjoyed this right by
express statute." 7
Massachusetts, too, provides for suit against the Commonwealth-a right, however, limited by judicial decision
to claims arising ex conlraclu.8

New York has a ." Board of Claims," which, notwithstanding its name, is a strictly judicial tribunal, having
power to issue subpoenas, and to fine for contempt, and
from whose ju.dgments appeals lie to the Court of'Appeals.
I Hans v. Louisiana, .I34 U. S., I.
United States v. Texas, 1431. S., 621.
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet., 657; Florida v. Georgia, 17
How., 478; Alabama v. Georgia, 23 How., 505; Virginia v. West Virginia,
ii Wall., 39; Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U. S., 479'; Virginia v. Tennessee,
148 U. S., 503.
4 As Indiana, Idaho and Nevada.
5 As Alabama.
6 In the States, however, the same need of power of suing the government is not felt as in the National Government, because most public
contracts are made by local corporations, which are everywhere subject
to suit. Goodnow, Comparative Administrative Law, Vol. ii, p. 166.
7 Higginbotham's Executrix v. Commonwealth, 25 Grattan, 637,
6 Murdock Parlor Grate Co. v. Commonwealth, 152 Mass., 28.
3
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Its jurisdiction, while limited generally, to claims arising
ex contractu, also extends to claims arising out of negligence in the management of canals operated bythe State.'
California goes further, and by a recent statute,
approved February 28, 1893, provides for bringing suit
against the State for all "claims on contract, or for negligence, against the State," and allows interest to be awarded
on all claims from the time the obligation accrued.
The allowance of suit for negligence, and the provision for an award of interest on claims mark a forward step
in the recognition of the obligations of governments to do
justice. If the new statute of California shall receive a
construction as liberal as its terms seem to require, that
-State must be regarded as now occupying the first position
in this respect of all the State of the Union.'
Other States having provisions for suits against the
government are West Virginia, Noi-th Carolina, Mississippi,
South Dakota, Idaho and Nevada.
Passing.now from our own country to England, BLACKSTONt says,. in regard to the petition of right: "And, first,
as to private injuries: if any person has, in point of property, a just demand upon the king, he must petition him
in his Court of Chancery, where his chancellor will admin-

ister right as a matter of grace, though not up'on compulsion. And this is entirely consonant to what is laid down
by the Writers on natural law. 'A subject,' says Puffendorf, 'so long as he continues- a subject, hath no way to
ohlige his prince to give him his due, when he refuses it;
* though no wise prince will ever refuse to stand to a lawful
contract. And, if the prince will give the subject leave to
enter an action against him, upon such contract, in his
own courts, the action itself proceeds rather upon natural equity than upon the municipal laws. Foi the end of
such actions is not to comtel the prince to observe the
contract, but to fiersuade him."

2

1 Sayre v. State, 128 N. Y., 622; Sipple v. State, 99 N.Y., 284; Bowen
v. State, io8 N. Y., 66; Splittorff v. State, lO8 N. Y., 205.
2 1 Blackstone's Commentaries 243.
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This certainly does not give us the idea.of a very strong
or effective remedy, and some of the remarks of the celebrated
commentator, in a later part of his work, seem still further
to limit its scope, for he says that it "is of use, where the
king is in full possession of any hereditaments or chattels,
and the petitioner suggests such a right as controverts the
title of the crown, grounded on facts disclosed in the
petition."

This apparently confines the remedy to claims for the
recovery of specific property, real, or personal. Whether,
indeed, the remedy were not limited to this class of cases
remained a doubtful question as lately as 1874. In that
year the Queen's Bench upon great consideration, and
regarding the question as one of great difficulty, decided
that the petition of right lay for the recovery of damages
for breach of contract by the Crown.' It was said, howqvdri
that the authorities leading to this conclusion were "many
of them atitiquated and connected with forms of procedure
•with which no one now alive is familiar." A reference at
this late day to such ancient authorities as alone capable
of settling a point of such apparent simplicity is of.the
utmost significance. Nothing could more conclusively
demonstrate the infrequency and the want of practical efficiency of the proceeding appointed by the English-law for
the redress of grievances against the government.
Nor does it appear that the "Petitions of Right Act,
i86o" has removed the difficulties inherent in this form of
proceeding. It is true that the procedure was simplified by
that act, and assimilated to that in cases between subject
and subject. The act provided,* however, that it was not
to "be construed to give to the subject any remedy against
the Crown in any case in which he would not have
been entitled to such remedy before the passing of this
act." Thus the remedy, while somewhat simplified, is not
enlarged by a hair's breadth.
Again, facilities are afforded the suitor in this country
3 Blackstone's Commentaries, 256.
'Thomas v. The Queen, L. R., io

Q.

B., 3.
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by way of calls upon the executive departments for information and papers' necessary, and often indispensable
for the prosecution of the suit, which are-denied in England, where no rule can be made upon a department of the
government ,for the production of papers desired by the
suppliant in support of his petition of right.'
Every petition of right must first be left at the Home
Department in order that it may receive Her Majesty's fiat,
"Let right be done."
Without this indorsement no court
in England can take cognizance of the case. It has sometines been stated, in a loose and general way, that this fiat
is grantable of right, or is, at all events, refused only in
special and extraordinary cases.3 But from an official stateinelit 4 before me, it appears that of thirty-eight petitions
acted upon at that Department, from 1884 to 1889, the fiat
was granted in twenty-four ca.es and refused in fourteen.
A right to sue, which depends upon the permission of the
defendant, and that permission so frequently withheld, can
hardly be regarded as of great value. With us the right of
suit in the Court of Claims is absolute.
General Schenck, while American Minister at London,
by direction of the State Department, made some inquiries
regarding the prosecution of claims against Her Majesty's
government, and the result seems to have impressed him
with "the doubts and difficulties in the way of the prosecution of any such claim," 5 rather than with the means or
facilities afforded for that purpose. This impression seems
to be justified. by the narrow limits within which the
remedy is confined, the lack of facilities for its successful
prosecution,- and the infrequency with which claimants
find it advisable to avail themselves of the remedy afforded.
' Rev. Stat. U. S., 1076.
2 Thomas v. The Queen, L.R., ioQ. B, 44.
'United States v. O'Keefe, ii Wall., 178, 184.
4Furnished through the British Legation at Washington, to Hon.
William A. Richardson, Chief Justice of the Court of Claims, to whom
I am indebted for permission to use it.
5 Report of Hon. Win. Lawrence, House Report No. 134, 43 d Congress, 2d Session, p. 191.
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No petition of right can be maintained -on claims
for damages caused by the negligence of public officers
or servants. The rule. that " The king can do no wrong"
forbids the application of the maxim reshondeal "suieor.
t the acts of the agents, of the Crown.'
Still, there are some classes of cases in which the
1tardship, and, indeed, the utter injustice, arising from the
application of this old maxim have persuaded the courts,
by a sort of circuity, to do justice by indirection where they
could not do it directly. 'This is notably true in cases of
the collision of public with private 'vessels, resulting in'
damage to the latter. This is a class of cases of lamentable
frequency in this country, and of quite as lamentable failure of justice.
In England, however, a libel in remz may be filed
against the offending vessel. The Court thereupon directs
the register to write to the Lords of the Admiralty asking
the entry bf an appearance on behalf of the Crown, which
is generally given, and the proceedings are then conducted;
to decree as in other cases. It is true that no warrant ,
issues in these cases for the arrest of the vessel of the
Crown, but the proceedings are strictly judicial; the suits,'
are instituted and conducted on the hypothesis that claims, "
against the offending vessel are created by the eollisionand while the vessels are not taken into custody it is presumed that the government will. at once satisfy a decree
rendered by its. own tribunals in a case in which it has'.
"/
voluntarily appeared. 2
With us no officer of the government is authorized to
enter an appearance, and hence an act of Congress has to
be asked for, giving a special jurisdiction in the particular
case. Why the subject could not be dealt with upon gerreral lines instead of making each case a matter of grace
and favor it seems difficult to see. The only e:iplanation
is to be sought in the vicious habit on the part of Congress
Viscount Canterbury v. Attorney General, i Phillips, 306.
2 The "Athol," i v. Robinson, 382, cited and fully commented on
in the "Siren," 7 Wall., 152.
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of dealing out justice by piecemeal, and by way of individual favor, where it ought to be administered by general
laws applicable alike to high and low.
aSo again where public works are in their c6nstruction
and operation under the charge of Boards of Commissioners,
invested with the necessary p6wers by acts of Parliament,
a id error or neglect occurs, causing damage to individuals,
the commissioners, or members of the board, are held liable,
but the damages are paid out of government funds in their
" hands.,. This might be regarded as more similar to
suits against municipal corporations than to claims against
* governments. This is true so far as the form of the action is
concerned, but in reality it seems to be more in the nature of
a claim against the government itself. Such works are
usually with us under the charge of the corps of engineers
of the arny in connection with the improvement of rivers
and harbors. These works are large, and of growing magnitude and importance, but no adequate provision is made in
our laws for redress where the property of the citizen is
'taken or injured in the course of the operations.
Many of the colonies of England have extended the
right of suit against the Crown, which is in effect a suit
against the government of the colony, far beyond the
measure of redress granted by the jurisprudence of the
mother country. In the island of Ceylon a very extensive
practice of suing the Crown on contract had sprung up, and
had been recognized in hundreds of decisions. It was
thought to have been derived from the Roman-Dutch law
in force in Ceylon prior to the British conquest in 1799.
It was not quite clear whether that law did really allow
such suits, but whether it did or not, the right was
put on a firm basis by a legislative ordinance of the colony
'adopted in i868, which in spdcific terms conferred jurisdiction of such suits upon the district courts of the island,
M1
Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, L. R., I H. L., 93; Addison on
Torts, ch. 16, s. 14, H 1043, 1047.
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thus recognizing the right so specifically as to confer the
jurisdiction even if by pre-existing law there were none.'
A statute of New South Wales 2 entitled "An Act to
enforce claims against the Colonial Government and to
give costs in Crown suits" provides that "any person
having, or deeming himself to have, any claim or demand
whatever against the government of this Colony may set
forth the same in a petition to the governor, praying him
to appoint a nominal defendant in the matter of such petition," and then authorizes the governor to name a nominal
defendant, but if he does not do so within one month the
Colonial Treasurer is to be the defendant. "In any action
or suit under this Act all necessary judgments, decrees and
orders may be given and made, and shall include every
species of relief, whether by way of specific performance,
or restitution .of rights, for recovery of lands or chattels, or
payment of money or damages."
The Colonial Treasurer is to pay all damages and costs
awarded in such cases out of any moneys in his hands
legally applicable thereto, " and in the event of such payment not being paid within sixty days after demand execution may be had for the amount and the same may be
levied upon any property vested in the government of this
Colony."
The Privy Council thus construes this statute: "Thus
unless the plain words are to be restricted for any good
reason, a complete remedy is given to any person having,
or deeming himself. to have, any just claim or demand
whatever, against, the government. These words are
amply sufficient to include a claim for damages for a
tort committed by the local government by their servants. II
The reason is.then given for the distinction between
* the colonial law and that of England, as follows: " It must
be borne in mind that the local governments in/the colonies, as pioneers of improvements are frequently obliged to
I Appu v. Queen's Advocate, 9 App. Cas., 571.
239

Victoria, No. 39.
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embark in undertakings which in other countries are left
to private enterprise, such, for instance, as the construction
of railways, canals and other works for the construction of
which it is necessary to employ inferior officers and workmen. If therefore the maxim that 'The king can do no
wrong' were applied to colonial governments in- the way
now contended for by the appellants it would work much
greater hardship than it does in England." 1
Here we have a broad admission that the old maxim
does work hardship in England coupled with a bold act
of legislation abrogating the rtile in the colonies, and a
broad and liberal rule of judicial construction applied to
that legislation. To my mind, however, the most remarkable feature of the legislation is one not adverted to in the
decision which I have quoted. This is the subjection of
'the government of the colony to the issuance of an execution in case of non-payment within sixty days.
In England, and in this country alike, "The proceedJugs end with the recovery of the judgments. After they
are obtained it depends in England upon the Parliament,
and in this c6untry on Congress whether or not they shall
be paid." 2 The suitor, even atter obtaining his judgment,
must still approach the sovereign on bended knee, a "suppliant" as he is most appropriately termed in England, a
"petitioner" in this country, with a humble prayer for
payment of the sum judicially awarded. But the Australian suitor may of right demand immediate payment of his
judgment, and may seize the colonial property in case of
default with little more ceremony or delay than he would
that of John Doe or Richard Roe.
The law of the Straits Settlements' and of New Zealand 4 is similar. In these colonies suits against the
Crown, both on contracts and- torts, are freely permitted.
While these colonies still acknowledge the dominion of
the Crown, though they may not like us have adopted a
'Farnell v. Bowman, 12 App. Cas., 643.
United States v. O'Keefe, in Wall., 178, 184.
Attorney General v. Wemyss, 13 App. Cas., 192.
'The Queen v. Williams, 9 App. Cas., 418.
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Declaration of Independence, yet the "right divine of kings
,j govern wrong" must still be regarded as more in force
,n this country than there, so long as our laws pernit
)fficers of the government in any case to ride rough shod
ver the rights of citizens without redress.
It is not quite clear whether Canada has yet come up
to the same ample measure of justice. Suits against the
Crown on contract are freely allowed there, 1 and the government has been held liable for damages to water works
by the, construction of a government dam. 2 A recent statute gives the Court of Exchequer jurisdiction of "every
claim against the*Crown arising out of death or injury to
the person or property on any public work resulting from
the negligence of any officer or servant of the Crown, while
acting within the scope of his'duties or employment."'
The construction of this statute is probably as yet unsettled,
but if construed with the. same spirit of fairness and liberality as that of New South Wales it shows that our northern neighbor has come up to the position which neither
England nor this country has yet been willing to take, that
the government cannot assume the powers and privileges
of an owner of property without also being subjected to the
responsibilities incident to such ownership.
The law of France differs so greatly from ours and that
of England in its separation of the droit adninistraliffrom
the ordinary, law of the land that it is far frtm easy to say
to what extent its law, as compared with that of England
and of the countries.which are or have been English col-,
onies, offers a speedy, practical and efficient remedy to
claimants against the governmetit. Certain it is that " an
individual in his dealings with the State does not, according to French ideas, stand on anything like the same footing on which he stands in dealing with his neighbor.
. "A, for example, being a private person, enters
into a
contract with X, also a private person. X breaks the

IHumphrey v. The Queen,

20 Canada Sup. Ct., 59T.
2 The Queen v. St. John Water Commissioners, r9 Canada Sup. Ct.,

3 The Queen v. Martin,

20

Canada Sup. Ct., 240.
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contract. A has a right to recover from X damages equivalent to the gain which A would have made if X had kept
to his bargain.
"A entets into an exactly similar contract with N, an
official acting on behalf of some department of the government. N, or in fact the department, breaks the contract.
A has a right to claim from the government, not, as in the
case of the action against X, damages equivalent to the
gain which he would have made if the contract had been
kept, but only damages equivalent to the loss (if any) which
A may have actually suffered by the breach of contractIn other words, the State, when it breaks a contract, ought,
according to French ideas, to suffer less than would a private wrong-doer.
"In the example here given, which is merely one
among a hundred, the essential character of droil administratif become apparent-it is a body of law intended to

preserve the 'privileges of the State."'
.In dealing with war claims it must be acknowledged
-that the government of France has taken a position far
superior to that of our own. Immediately after the FrancoPrussian War, the National Assembly passed laws for the
inidemnification of all persons who had suffered losses during the German invasion. In the administration of this
law the most liberal spirit was iranifested. No distinction
was made, on account of the cause of the damages. All
persons Who had suffered material losses in consequence of
the war were allowed to present" their claims. There was
no kind of damage resulting from the war for which relief
was not granted, and that without respect to persons.
Foreigners-even Germans as well as others-were allowed
to receive a share of the indemnity granted. Well might
our Chargi d'Affaires at Paris, in transmitting official
information on this subject, remark: "A captious spirit
might suggest that thih was intended as a hint to us to do
likewise."'
I Dicey, Law of the Constitution, pp. 3o8, 3o9.
2Letter

of the Duke Decazes to Minister Washburn, House Report

No. 134, 43d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 74-76.
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Though the Franco-Prussian war was not begun till
our own civil war had been five years ended, the war
claims of France have been for many years settled and
adjusted, instead of hanging on like our own into well nigh
a third of a century. Grossly as the amount of these claims
has been exaggerated on the stump, and even in official reports, it still remains true that there are several millions
of them pending before the courts unadjusted, and even
a large number of adjudicated claims upon which no action
has been taken by Congress.'
Claims against governments on the part of foreigners
are often settled through the agency of mixed International
Commissions. While such commissions are admirable
instrumentalities for the settlement of great national controversies like the Behring Sea question, they are unsatisfactory tribunals for the adjudication of private rights. The
ideas of international law prevailing in one commission
may be, and often are, totally different from those governing another. Their expenses are always heavy, often quite
out of proportion to the amount of business transacted. In
more than one instance the defendant government has
made charges of fraud, and has demanded-whether with
justice or not, it would be improper here to suggest-a
re-examination of so much of the proceedings as adversely
affected her.2 With the adoption by every country of a
complete system of remedial justice in cases of government
claims, in the due execution of which foreign governinents
and their citizens could have confidence, the necessity for
these temporary and exceptional tribunals would disappear,
and there would be no more occasion for diplomatic intervention in the settlement of claims against foreign governments than in that of claims against private citizens of a
foreign nation.
I The laws and statistics in regard to war claims are admirably summarized in a speech of Hon. Benjamin A. Enloe, of Tennessee, in the House
of Representatives, January 16, 1893; Cong. Rec., 52d Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt I pp. 607-6o.
222 U. S. Statutes at Large, 643; 27 id., 409 410.
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In any new legislation on the subject of claims
there should be an abrogation of the unjust prohibition

against allowing interest, except where expressly stipulated for eo nomine. In cases where the payment of a
specific sum at a definite time is agreed upon, the
damage arising from the delay constitutes a grievance as
actual as the non-payment of the principal sum. The
redress afforded for this grievance by the ordinary law of
"the land against a private defendant is the allowance of
legal interest. The only reason for denying it against the
government is an absurd legal tradition that the government is always ready and willing to pay its debts. This in
turn rests upon 0he maxim invented by court sycophants
that "to know an injury and to redress it are inseparable
in the royal breast." Such time-honored falsehoods are
small comfort to a government contractor sorely pressed, and
perhaps ruined, by the failure of the government to pay
him money which he is obliged himself, ineanwhile, to
replace in his business at high rates of interest. The
government slould place itself on the plane of justice
in this respect, and give compensation where it has been
guilty of unreasonable delay.
The courts should also be invested with authority to
pass tipon claims arising from torts where these arise out
of negligence of the officers and .5gents of the government
in the construction or operation of public works. Even in
England the denial of a remedy in such cases, in accordance with the rule that "the king can do no Wrong," is
treated as a mere local rule of English law, and as inapplicable to most if not all of her colonies.'
I A learned authority thus states the continental rule on this subject,
which it will be observed is in striking accordance with Attorney-General
Cushing's opinion, cited in the text (post, p. IOI5) : "On the continent
the rule is, that the government is liable to be sued by an individual in
contract and also in tort, where the tortious act is not committed in the performance of functions of a distinctly public legal character, and where the
fault of the officer causing it is not purely personal to himself, but consists
rather in bad service, in an order badly given, not understood, or imprudently or carelessly executed.
Thus the government would not be held
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Judge COOLEY evidently repudiates the application of
this maxim in these cases, for in treating of torts he says :
"Even the State or the general Government may be guilty
ofindividual wrongs; for, while each is a sovereign, it is a
corporation also, and as such capable of doing wrongful acts.
The difficulty here is with the remedy, not with the right.
No sovereignty is subject to suits, except .with its own
consent. But either this consent is given by general law,
or some tribunal is established with power to hear all ju~t
claims.. Or, if neither of these is done, the tort remains; and
it is always to be presumed thit the legislative authority
will make the proper provision for redress when its attention is directed to the injury." '
And Attorney-General
CUSHING, in a profound opinion delivered in 1855, draws a*
distinction between two classes of officers engaged in the
transaction of public affairs: "One employed in the collection of the revenues and to the care of the public property,
who represent the proprietary. interests of the government,
and another class who are the agents of society itself, and
are appointed by the government only in its relation and
capacity offiarensp6atri&. For the acts of the former the'
government holds itself responsible in many cases because
their acts are performed for the immediate interests of the
government. But, for the acts, of the latter, no government,
holds itself pecuniarily responsible." 2
Surely it is time that our government should take rank
with those progressive countries which have abandoned the
idea, worthy only of- a despot, that governments may
enjoy all the advantages and privileges connected with the
responsible for damages caused by its agents in the collection of taxes,
while it would be if a ship were injured by the negligence of the officers
of one of its men-of-war." Comparative Administrative Law, by Prof.
Frank J. Goodnow, Vol.ni, p. 161, a valuable and interesting work, which
just reaches me as this paper goes to press.
Cooley on Torts, p. 122.
2 7 Opinions of Attorneys General, 229, 237, 238. See, also, the able
reports of Senator Pike on the case of John Williams, Sen. Rep., 825, 4 9 th
Cong., ist Sess., and of Senator Hoar on the case of the steamer "I. N.
Bunton," Sen. Rep., 2692,5oth Congress, 2d Sess., holding the same view.
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ownership of property while they evade the responsibilities
inherent in such ownership.
The time must come when the citizen injured by the
mismanagement of government property, whether it be by
such an accident as the recent one at the Ford's Theatre
'Building in Washington, or by the collision of a vessel with
an armed ship of the United States, or with the piers of a
dam, or by any other of the ways in which government prop,erty may be so used as to cause damage to others, shall
have a legal right of redress against the government whose
officers or agents have caused the injury, instead of being
remitted as-now to the mere exercise of legislative favor and
discretion.
In the line of the improvement of our own policy
- in dealing with claims, I would put in the fore-front the
idea .of an exclusion of any attempt on the part of the
legislative authority to deal with special cases.
Congress, under the .Constitution, is organized with reference
to the great subjects of national legislation. On these
topics it has every facility for full inquiry, thorough
debate and right decision. But it is not a court, and has
neither the organization nor the machinery to enable it to
deal successfully with the adjustment of private rights.
The limits of a session are far too brief for the full consideration of the important measures of general public
interest affecting the finance, the commerce, the public
health, the diplomatic relatioins, and the hundred other
great interests of the country confided to the charge of Congress.
That a national legislature, pressed with such
public duties, should, in addition, undertake the'task of
passing separately upon the validity of private claims,
ranging from millions in amount to such demands as for
the value of a horse, or a hundred cords of wood, is such
an absurdity as to seemp incredible, were it not unhappily a
matter of daily experience during the sessions of Congress.
No other legislature in the world attempts such a
thing. Our own certainly does not succeed in the performance of it. Not one in ten of the claims reported to
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the House of Representatives by its committees are ever
considered by that body at all. Such as are usually get
before the House by unanimous consent, or under a suspension of the rules, thus going through in spite of, rather
than in accordance with, settled principles of legislative
action.
It is not that the claims are not just, for many if not
most of them are; nor that members of Congress desire
to be encumbered with these duties, for many of them
would gladly be rid of these onerous burdens on their time
and patience.
A more thankless duty than that of a member of the
House Committee on Claims or War Claims it would be
difficult to imagine. Suppose such a member devotes
himself for a whole session, as many of them do, with'
painstaking care to the examination of the cases coming
before his committee. He will probably find little difficulty
in getting his recommendations adopted by his committee,
and by them reported to the House. When, however, he
sees week after week and ni6nth after month pass by, and
his carefully studied reports completely ignored, or even-if
called up for adoption defeated by a hasty, passionate or
unintelligent objection, he may well grow discouraged and
become so disgusted at the whole system as to be unwilling
to continue the work of Sisyphus rolling the stone up. hill
only to see it roll down again; for the end of one ,brief
Congress annuls all the work of the committees that has
not been consummated into law, and in the next Congress
the whole. has to be gone over .again. Under such disheartening circumstances the only wonder is that the work
of these committees is so well and thoroughly done as it
generally is.
Nor is the evil much remedied by the passage of laws
such as the so-called "Bowman Act," or "French Spoliation Act," 2 conferring upon the Court of Claims a jurisdic1 1883, March 3, ch. i16, Supp. to Rev. Stat. U. S., 403; and the
similar provisions of 1887, March 3, ch. 359, See. 12, 14, i Supp. to Rev.
Stat. U. S., 56r, 562.
" 1885, January 20, ch. 25, I Supp. to Rev. Stat. U. S., 471.
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lion of aii "ancillary" or "advisory" character. ' Under
these acts the Court finds facts and conclusions of law, or
both, and without entering any judgment merely reports
them for further action. Such laws put the cart before
-the horse. Instead of defining the liability of the United
811tes, and then leaving suitors to bring their cases within
that definition if they can, they provide for a litigation
-which determines nothing, and is binding upon no one.
They are unjust to the claimants in inviting them into the
cohirts to establish their claims, without affording the
slightest iecurity for the attainment of any substantial
result in case of the4i success in the litigation. They are
equally so to the government in not giving it an absolute
security against the resuscitation of a claim once by competent authority judicially overruled.
The true field for the exertion of the powers of Congress on the subject of claims is to be found in defining
the liability of the government by general laws applicable
to all claimants. This is a field for statesmanship worthy
to employ the ablest minds in either house of the national
legislature. Those whose claims are within the principles
of liability thus defined should obtain the substantial fruits
of their litigation by getting an absolute and binding
judgment against the government. Those whose claims
cannot pass the test of liability thus defined in advance
should be saved the expense and trouble of bringing their
cases before the courts.
The task of defining the liability of the government
is not one of ifisuperable difficulty. True, there are some
difficulties in questions of governmental liability, owing to
the peculiarity of the various branches of the administrative machinery of the government,, but, after all, the
underlying principles do not radically differ from those
governing the transact-ions of private parties.
Again and again have matters which were thought to
be proper subjects for legislative action been brought
within the scope of general law, and always with the

I In

re Sanborn, 148

LT. S., 222, 226.
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greatest advantage to both the government and the
citizeh.
Acts of attainder were at one time defended on the
ground that the ordinary criminal law might not always
be sufficient, and that the power should be reserved to th6
legislature to deal with special cases of exceptional gravity.
In the case of Sir John Fenwick we are told by
Macaulay: "The opponents of the bill did not,-indeed,venture to say that there could be no public danger.
sufficient to justify an act of attainder. They admitted
that there might be cases in which the general rule must
bend to. an overpowering necessity." 1
But custom in England, and the written constitution
here, forbid the passage of such laws now, and crime instead
of being more secure from punishment is less frequent, and
is more certain, -when committed, to be punished.
Special acts of divorce were once regarded as within
the legitirmate sphere, of legislative activity,' but that notion
has long since been exploded, and divorces are now regarded
as properly grantable only- by the courts, and in specific,
cases defined by general law.
Even charters of incorporation, once regarded as
among the highest acts of sovereignty, and grantable only
by special legislation, are now conferred under general laws,
which have relieved such charters from the odium attached
to special acts of legislative favoritism and monopoly.
That claims against the government should be equally
brought within the scope of general legislation, and that
all arbitrary, special and exceptional measures of relief
should be entirely done away with, ought, I should think,
to be a truism so forcible as only to be stated to command
assent.
With the liability of the government defined in advance by laws equally applicable to all, and with an impartial tribunal meting out equal justice to every suitor,
irrespective of political influence or personal solicitation,
'Macaulay, History of England (Harpers' edition), Vol. v, p. 199.
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S., 19o.
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no citizen' can have just cause of complaint. Hardships
will, indeed, occcur, but hardships are inseparable from
every system of hunjn justice. Better, far better, were it
" that occasional instances of this kind should happen than
that the time and attention of the national legislature
should be in such large measure occupied as it is now in
the consideration of purely private and personal interests.
Better were it, too, that the claimant having even a just
and honest demand should learn once for all, if need be,
that he must fail in law, than that he should be kept waiting for tedious years knocking at the doors of Congress,
only to lose his case by an adjournment just before his bill
.is reached, pr by a "pocket veto," happening only because
a weary President has not the time to devote to the con§ideration of his measure, or by any of the thousand
. legislative accidents on which the fate of private bills
in'Congress so largely turn. The congressional claimant
is an anomalous survival from the past. There should
be no place for him in a land where laws are based upon
equal and exact justice.
The ruling idea which should govern all legislation
on the subject of claims should be the absolute removal
of private demands against the government from the sphere
of arbitrary power, political partisanship, or personal favoritism into the domain of general law.
Washington, D.C.

